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THE CONFUSION CREATED BY THE
CARPARTS DECISION
MARC L. ZAKEN*
Unlike the first panel of speakers, I am not much of a philoso-
pher or an economist. I am a very practical person, and my job as
a management lawyer is to communicate to my clients, some of
whom are very large Fortune 500 companies, what the Americans
with Disabilities Act (the "ADA")1 means and how they are sup-
posed to apply and follow it. It may surprise some of the more
strident members of the plaintiff's bar to find that those of us on
the management side of the table do follow the law, and I try to
explain to my clients what their obligations are under the law. I
think the goal of every management lawyer is to keep his or her
clients out of court and that is what I try to do.
When the ADA initially passed, as a practitioner, I spent a lot of
time attempting to explain to management clients what the legis-
lation would mean to their business interests. At first, I thought I
had a handle on it. Nevertheless, as a result of the decision in
Carparts Distribution Center, Inc. v. Automotive Wholesaler's As-
sociation, Inc.,2 I realized that I do not understand the ADA at all.
In order to illustrate why I was so confused by the Carparts de-
cision, I would like to go back to a case decided prior to the enact-
ment of the ADA, McGann v. H & H Music Company.3 In Mc-
Gann, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
* B.S., Cornell University's School of Industrial and Labor Relations, 1979; J.D., New
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tee of the Torts and Insurance Practice Section of the American Bar Association. He is also
the president of the Southwestern Connecticut chapter of the Industrial Relations Re-
search Associations.
I Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. V 1993)).
2 37 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 1994).
3 946 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 482 (1992).
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held that under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 4
("ERISA") an employer could cap Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome ("AIDS") insurance benefits at $5,000, even though
they continued to reimburse other insurance benefits for up to one
million dollars. 5 The holding in McGann was clear, and whether
we agreed with the decision or not, at least we could understand
it. Yet, it was expected that when the ADA passed, it probably
would change the landscape created by the McGann decision.6
Subsequently, in June 1993, the Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission (the "EEOC") issued an Interim Enforcement
Guidance on the ADA, 7 explicitly stating that a cap on health in-
surance for AIDS benefits as opposed to other benefits is discrimi-
natory under the ADA.8 This was still no surprise to those of us on
the management side of the table.
The anticipated change came in the form of a far-reaching deci-
sion by the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in
Carparts. The case was brought by Ronald Senter, a small busi-
nessman in New Hampshire, who was the sole shareholder of and
also employed by the automotive parts wholesale distributorship,
Carparts Distribution Center ("Carparts").9 Carparts and other
similar type wholesalers participated in a trade association. 10 The
wholesalers combined into a trade association, and probably in or-
der to save on health insurance, they created a self-funded medi-
cal reimbursement plan." Each of the automobile wholesalers
contributed money into the fund on behalf of their employees and
4 Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1990) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1462
(1988)).
5 McGann, 946 F.2d at 408.
6 See generally Lizzette Palmer, Comment, ERISA Preemption and its Efforts on Cap-
ping the Health Benefits of Individuals with AIDS: A Demonstration of Why the United
States Health and Insurance Systems Require Substantial Reform, 30 Hous. L. REV. 1347,
1349-53 (1993).
7 See Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, Interim Enforcement Guidance on Ap-
plication of the Am. With Disabilities Act to Disability Based Distinction in Employer Pro-
vided Health Ins. (June 8, 1993) [hereinafter EEOC Interim Guidance].
8 See generally Patrick J. Morgan, Applicability of ADA Non-Discrimination Principles to
Self-Insured Health Plans: Do "AIDS Caps" Violate the Law?, 11 J. CONrEMa. HEALTH L. &
POL'Y 221, 224-25 (1994).
9 Carparts, 826 F. Supp. 583, 584 (D.N.H. 1993), vacated and remanded, 37 F.3d 12 (1st
Cir. 1994).
10 Carparts, 826 F. Supp. at 584. The trade association was known as Automotive
Wholesaler's Association of New England, Inc. Id.
11 Id. Carparts was a participant in a self-funded medical reimbursement plan known as
Automotive Wholesaler's Association of New England Health Benefit Plan and its adminis-
tering trust, Automotive Wholesaler's Association of New England, Inc. Insurance Plan. Id.
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appointed a third-party administrator. This administrator man-
aged the money, paid out claims as they came in, and ensured that
people received the coverage that they were promised.
In May 1986, Mr. Senter was diagnosed with Human Immu-
nodeficiency Virus ("HIV") and soon after he was afflicted with
AIDS-related illnesses.12 Around this time, he began to submit
claims to the trade association, the third-party administrator, and
the self-funded plan, for payment of his medical treatment. They
reimbursed him for his medical expenses for a while. However,
effective January 1, 1991, perhaps as a result of the McGann deci-
sion, the self-funded plan amended its prior plan by placing a limi-
tation on AIDS coverage at $25,000.13 In January 1993, Mr.
Senter died.14 The co-executors of his estate maintained this ac-
tion against the trade association and the self-funded plan claim-
ing that the cap on his benefits was illegal discrimination under
the ADA. x5
At the district court level, I will focus on two theories of liability
that were offered. The first theory was that the trade association
and the self-funded plan were liable as employers under Title I of
the ADA. 6 The trade association and the self-funded plan rebut-
ted that they did not actually employ Mr. Senter. Initially, it ap-
peared that Mr. Senter had a great claim against his employer,
because under the ADA it is clear that an employer cannot dis-
criminately cap health insurance benefits. 7 However, for Mr.
Senter to sue his employer would have been tantamount to him
suing himself, since he was his employer.
The United States District Court for the District of New Hamp-
shire, agreeing with my interpretation of the ADA, held that the
trade association and the insurance plan were not employers
under the ADA."" Mr. Senter was self-employed, therefore, the
trade association and the insurance plan, not actually employing
12 Id. at 585.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 584.
15 Carparts, 826 F. Supp. at 584.
16 42 U.S.C. § 12111(2) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Title I of the ADA provides that "[n]o
covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of
the disability . . . in regard to . . . terms, conditions and privileges of employment." 42
U.S.C. § 12112(a). Covered entity includes "an employer, employment agency, labor organi-
zation, or joint labor-management committee." Id.; see also Carparts, 826 F. Supp. at 585
(discussing employer liability under Title I of ADA).
17 See EEOC Interim Guidance, supra note 7.
18 Carparts, 826 F. Supp. at 585.
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Mr. Senter, were not liable to his estate under Title I of the
ADA.19 Nevertheless, Mr. Senter's estate pursued their claim
against the trade association and the health insurance plan on
appeal.
The second theory leveled at the district court was that the
trade association and the health insurance plan was an "accom-
modation" under Title III of the ADA.20 Title III sets forth that a
public accommodation means a physical structure. 21 The statute
maintains that a physical place cannot discriminate against a per-
son with a disability. For instance, this means that if this individ-
ual was visually impaired, hearing impaired or mobility impaired,
and this individual went to a bank, a grocery store, or a movie
theater, some accommodation would have to be made for this per-
son. For instance, the grocery store would have to help him or her
get things off the shelf. The bank would have to lower the ATM
machine, so that a person in a wheelchair could take money out of
it. The movie theater would have to set up a place where some-
body in a wheelchair could sit. Basically, a public accommodation
was a place that had to make accessibility-type corrections to its
facility to enable people with disabilities to gain access to services
or goods. I understood this, and when I informed my clients they
may not have liked it, but they understood it as well.
The district court in Carparts held that neither the trade associ-
ation nor the self-funded insurance plan were public accommoda-
tions .2 About the same time as the Carparts decision, the District
Court for the Southern District of Ohio issued a similar ruling in
Pappas v. Bethesda Hospital Ass'n.23 The court in Pappas agreed
with the district court in Carparts, holding, in similar circum-
stances, that a health insurance plan, self-funded plan, or trade
association, is neither an employer nor a place of public accommo-
dation 4 Therefore, there was no liability under the ADA. The
Pappas decision made perfect sense to me.
19 See id.
20 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Title III of the American with Disabilities
Act provides that "no individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability...
by any person who owns, leases, or operates a place of public accommodation." Id.
21 Carparts, 826 F. Supp. at 586. The district court interpreted the definition of public
accommodation as being limited to "actual physical structures with definite physical
boundaries which a person physically enters." Id.
22 Id. at 585.
23 861 F. Supp. 616 (S.D. Ohio 1994).
24 Pappas, 861 F. Supp. at 618, 620.
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In October 1994, Carparts was appealed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, and that court issued an
extraordinary decision.2 5 The First Circuit held that the trade as-
sociation and the self-insured plan could be considered employers
under three separate theories. 6 The court also held that the
trade association and the health insurance plan could be consid-
ered a public accommodation even though neither was a physical
place.
The First Circuit came to their decision, that the trade associa-
tion and the self-funded plan could be employers, based on three
theories. First, if the trade association had the authority to deter-
mine the level of benefits to be provided to the plan's participants,
then they would be acting as an employer who exercises control
over a significant aspect of the employment relationship. 2 For ex-
ample, if the trade association and the insurance plan shared ad-
ministrative responsibilities or set the level of benefits, then each
could be considered an employer. This theory is similar to the
traditional notions of the employment law concept of joint em-
ployer. If the trade association and the health insurance plan are
meeting with the employer, setting the level of benefits, making
the determinations, and administering the plan, then they could
be held to be an employer.
Under the second theory, the court said that even if the trade
association and the insurance plan did not have the authority to
determine the level of benefits, if the employer retained the right
to control the manner in which the plan administered those bene-
fits, the trade association and the insurance plan could be consid-
ered agents of the employer. 29 Thus began the erosion from the
concept of joint employer to some kind of ephemeral agency con-
cept. Under the third theory the court was vague, stating that
even if the trade association and insurance plan are not agents,
and even if they are not joint employers, they may still be liable if
they substantially affect an employee of another entity.3 0
25 Carparts Distribution Ctr., Inc. v. Automotive Wholesaler's Ass'n, Inc., 37 F.3d 12, 21
(1st Cir. 1994).
26 See id. at 16-18.
27 Id. at 20.
28 Id. at 17.
29 Id. at 17-18.
30 Carparts, 37 F.3d at 18.
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Finally, the court addressed the issue of whether a public ac-
commodation must be a place with walls or structures. 31 The court
concluded that there are many entities, such as travel services,
which conduct business by telephone that may be considered an
accommodation.3 2 The court also noted that other places exist that
may be considered an accommodation, where a person does not
have to physically enter an office to obtain a service.33
The First Circuit proposed that a scenario of liability may exist
under Titles I and III. The court, however, did not say that the
trade association or the insurance plan was liable.3 4 Perhaps even
the court realized they were going a bit too far and that this may
not be the best theory, because they did not know enough about
the facts of the case.
For practical purposes, I had to determine what this case would
mean to management clients. I realized that with respect to man-
agement, the Carparts decision does not change the landscape all
that much, because, had the estate of Mr. Senter sued Carparts,
his employer, Carparts would have been liable under the ADA.
Management clients who purchase insurance for their employees
must continue to follow the guidelines set forth in the EEOC In-
terim Guidance. 35 For example, limitations on the number of
blood transfusions would be legitimate because it covers a broad
scope of illnesses, and does not necessarily single out a disabil-
ity.36 However, a health insurance plan that has a cap on AZT
treatments, singles out a disability, AIDS, and would be unlawful
discrimination under the ADA. 37 The Carparts decision does not
change the landscape with regard to what employers have to do
when purchasing insurance, but it dramatically changes the scope
of the landscape for insurance businesses.
The Carparts case was remanded to the District Court for the
District of New Hampshire to allow that court to develop the facts,
31 Id. at 19. The court reasoned that the plain meaning of the statutory language does
not require public accommodations to have physical structures for persons to enter. Id.
32 Id. (citing Sierra Club v. Larson, 2 F.3d 462, 467 (1st Cir. 1993)).
33 Carparts, 37 F.3d at 19.
34 Id. at 20.
35 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
36 See EEOC Interim Guidance, supra note 7. Health related insurance distinctions
based upon a disability may violate the ADA. Id. A provision is so-based if it singles out a
disability, such as AIDS. Id. The EEOC Interim Guidance provides examples of discrimina-
tion that could possibly be found in health insurance provisions. Id.
37 See supra note 7, and accompanying text.
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and decide whether the employer or public accommodation theo-
ries are viable under the ADA.38 What is really frightening about
the Carparts decision is that I must inform insurance company
clients that if they sell a product in the form of a policy to anyone,
who then sells it or makes it available to its employees, and that
policy discriminates, the insurance company may be brought into
a lawsuit. Discrimination can be found in policies that provide
disparate coverage on the basis of the types of reimbursements or
types of coverage for treatment or prescription medications.39 Ac-
cording to Carparts, an insurance company may be liable for such
discrimination under the ADA based on allegations that the insur-
ance plan, by virtue of it being sold to an employer, gives rise to a
joint employer relationship, an agency relationship, or substan-
tially affects the rights of employees with whom no prior employ-
ment relationship existed.
Presently, an insurance company may be on the hook for plac-
ing a product on the market that can be construed as discriminat-
ing on the basis of a disability, or selling that product to an em-
ployer who is liable under Title I. The insurance company may
have to litigate the case through summary judgment, because the
First Circuit has said that a factual based inquiry is necessary. 40
When a factual based inquiry is necessary, the case will not get
thrown out on a motion to dismiss.
Thousands of dollars will be spent litigating through summary
judgment either the issue of whether a joint employer or agency
relationship exists or whether an employee's rights have been sub-
stantially affected by the policy. Under the public accommoda-
tions theory in Carparts, an insurance company may be liable,
even if it does not sell the insurance to an employer who provides
it to an employee. In contrast with liability under Title I as an
employer, for purposes of Title III liability, the public accommoda-
tions section, an employment or agency relationship does not have
to exist at all. If a disabled individual purchases an insurance
plan that has a discriminatory element, the decision in Carparts
suggests that this individual may bring an action based on allega-
tions under Title III, namely, that the insurance policy was dis-
38 Carparts Distribution Ctr., Inc., v. Automotive Wholesaler's Ass'n, Inc., 37 F.3d 12, 20
(1st Cir. 1994).
39 See EEOC Interim Guidance, supra note 7.
40 Carparts, 37 F.3d at 21.
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criminatory with respect to the provision of goods or services as a
public accommodation.
The Carparts decision is especially terrifying, at least with re-
spect to the public accommodations theory, because the ruling is
not necessarily limited to the provision of health insurance serv-
ices. Other types of arguments can be envisioned, that involve a
place without walls that provides a discriminatory service. For
instance, service may be provided by a travel agent, such as send-
ing a disabled person on a trip to stay in a hotel. The hotel is a
place of public accommodation and has to provide facilities that
are accessible to the disabled. However, does the travel agent,
selling the package as a provision of the service, now buy into lia-
bility for the hotel if the hotel does not have handicapped accessi-
ble bathrooms? I fear that this is just the tip of the iceberg on
bizarre theories that can be drawn from the Carparts decision.
